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THE ECONOMICS AND ETHICS OF LAND REFORM:
A CRITIQUE OF THE PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE
AND PEACE'S "TOWARD A BETTER DISTRIBUTION OF

LAND: THE CHALLENGE OF AGRARIAN REFORM"
WALTER BLOCK* AND GUILLERMO YEATTS**

I. INTRODUCTION
Land reform can be defined as the forced transfer of the
ownership of land from one person to another. This must be
distinguished from the voluntary transfer of land from one person to
another, such as ordinary buying and selling. In the latter case, there
can be no true third party. All those involved in land purchases -agents, insurers, lawyers -- are mere agents of one party or the other to
the agreement. But in the former there must be a third actor, the one
who forces one party to give up his land to a second party. This third
party is typically the government. Were this third party not involved in
the process, there could be no land reform.
In most land reform debates only two sides are represented.
These two, together, dominate all such discussions. On the one hand
there are those, usually called conservatives or right wing activists, who
oppose land reform per se.' They maintain that such forced transfers
are in total opposition to private property rights. From this perspective
land reform must be stopped, as private property rights are the very
bedrock of civilization. Once these rights are breached all law, to say
nothing of the economic well being of the populace, is in grave danger.
On the other hand there are those, usually called socialists or
left wing activists, who maintain that land reform is justified ifand only
ifthe donors of the land are rich or powerful and the recipients are poor
*Chairman, Department of Economics and Finance, University of Central
Arkansas.

**Chairman, Phoebus Energy, Ltd. B.S., M.A. New York University, OPM
Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration.
ISee LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM 45 (J. Kahane trans., Yale University Press
195 1); see also DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE FRASER INSTITUTE, MORALITY OF THE MARKET:
RELIGIOUS AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 497-98, 506-07 (1985).
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or powerless. Their argument is one of equity. Socialists maintain that
the privileged of the world are few; they own vast tracts of land which
are often not cultivated. In contrast, many people are poor and on the
verge of starvation. They have the labor power necessary to feed
themselves, but not the land upon which to do this.
One of the purposes of this paper is to explore a third
alternative in this debate, the libertarian or classical liberal position.
This analysis is important for three reasons. First, the other two
perspectives are at loggerheads. There is, seemingly, no possible
reconciliation between them. It is possible that the introduction of a
third philosophy of property rights and land reform may serve as an
ameliorating device, allowing each of the other two parties to
compromise with one another. Here, we speak not of compromise in
the sense of adding up the differences and dividing by two, but rather
of a principledcompromise where each is able to retain the best part
of its vision. Second, we shall maintain that while both the socialist and
conservative view have aspects of justice on their side, neither has a
monopoly in this regard. As presently constituted, both appear fatally
flawed. Each philosophy, however, shares certain libertarian elements.
If these can be brought out into the clear light of day, we can more
closely approximate the truth of the matter. In this essay, we shall
attempt to t-fer the view that only the classical liberal vision is in
accord with justice.
Finally, even if we cannot fully succeed in defending this
rather ambitious claim, this exercise will still prove beneficial by
providing a third alternative for society to consider. It may well be that
this dialogue, now intellectually dead in its tracks, may take on some
new light with the advent of a third viewpoint.
II. LIBERTARIAN LAND REFORM
A. The Libertarian Philosophy of Land Reform
What, then, is the libertarian philosophy of land reform? Such
a theory maintains both that forced transfers of land from one person to
another are justified, and that far from being incompatible with a strict
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regime of private property rights, land transfers are sometimes required
by this doctrine. While these transfers are often from rich to poor, this
is not required. It is even possible that justified land reform may enrich
the wealthy and impoverish the poor. Conservatives may therefore find
comfort in the fact that the libertarian position strongly upholds private
property rights, while socialists may exult in the fact that land reform
is not prohibited by the libertarian doctrine.
How can we reconcile these seemingly irreconcilable claims?
It is simple. Valuable items are sometimes stolen. When these items
are forcibly returned to their rightful owners, private property rights
are protected. The following example supports this position:
Suppose we are walking down the street and
we see a man, A, seizing B by the wrist and grabbing
B's wristwatch. There is no question that A is here
violating both the person and property of B. Can we
then simply infer from this scene that A is a criminal
aggressor, and B his innocent victim?
Certainly not -- for we don'tknow simply from
our observation whether A is indeed a thief, or whether
A is merely repossessing his own watch from B who
had previously stolen it from him. In short, while the
watch had undoubtedly been B's property until the
moment of A's attack, we don't know whether or not A
had been the legitimate owner at some earlier time,
and had been robbed by B. Therefore, we do not yet
know which one of the two men is the legitimate or
just property owner. We can only find the answer
through investigating the concrete data of the
particular case, i.e., through 'historical' inquiry.
Thus, we cannot simply say that the great
axiomatic moral rule of the libertarian society is the
protection of property rights, period. For the criminal
has no natural right whatever to the retention of
property that he has stolen; the aggressor has no right
to claim any property that he has acquired by
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aggression. Therefore, we must modify or rather
clarify the basic rule of libertarian society to say that
no one has the right to aggress against the legitimateor
just property of another.
In short, we cannot simply talk of defense of
'property rights' or of 'private property' per se. For if
we do so, we are in grave danger of defending the
'property right' of a criminal aggressor -- in fact, we
logically must do so. 2
The libertarian, then, must favor this "wristwatch" reform, as
A is the proper owner of the stolen property, while B is merely its
criminal possessor. Consider, however, the following situation: B, the
thief, passed the watch down to B', his son, whereupon B", the
grandson, inherited the watch and currently has possession. Presume
also that had A not had the time piece stolen from him, it would have
ended up the property of A", through a similar inheritance process. At
this point A" goes to the police and demands the return of the watch
from B". The latter objects that it is his privateproperty,and to engage
in the "wristwatch reform" described above constitutes socialism or
communism. With our libertarian insights, however, it is easy to see
the error of this response. Protecting B" under these conditions would
not uphold private property rights, but rather would denigrate them. B"
simply has no leg to stand upon. While he is not a thief, he is the
possessor of what must be considered stolen property. To allow him to
continue holding the watch would be to keep it from its rightful owner,
A"f.
Of course, in this scenario the burden of proof rests squarely
with A", the person attempting to alter and abolish present property
titles. As the old legal adage goes, "Possession is nine tenths of the
law," as it is the best evidence, in our uncertain world, of legitimate
title. But this is only a presumption. With appropriate evidence, it can
be defeated. If A" can prove he is the just owner, then the watch should
be returned to him. If somehow the forces of law and order could travel
2

MURRAY ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 51-52 (1982).
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back in time to capture B, the robber, they would be entitled to do more
than merely relieve him of his ill gotten gains.3 While B" is entirely
innocent of the original crime, it would be a denial of private property
rights to allow him to keep this stolen watch.
The problem with the conservative position is that it sometimes
amounts to a defense of thieves. Since the conservative philosophy is
linked with capitalism in the public mind, the free enterprise system is
widely dismissed as merely upholding the "survival of the fittest," or of
the claims of the rich against the poor. But nothing could be further
from the truth. Free enterprise does not at all condone land,or any other
kind, of theft; rather, this doctrine advocates the return of stolen
property.
If the libertarian position deviates from the conservative
philosophy, it also differs with the socialist view of redistribution from
rich to poor. To put this another way, libertarians agree with the
conservative advocacy of private property rights, but not with the claim
that it constitutes a legitimate defense of all extant property titles.
Rather, the libertarians agree with the socialists that forced transfer of
property titles are sometimes justified when it is necessary to effectuate
justice.
B. Property Redistribution
What is morally wrong with the socialist vision of coercively
possessions
from rich people and giving them to the poor? First,
taking
it is theft, and civilized societies have always looked askance upon
such actions. To the extent that massive stealing becomes the order of

3

See generally RANDY BARNETT & JOHN HAGEL, ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL 309-21
(1977); Charles J. King, A Rationalefor Punishment, 4 J. LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 151, 154 (1980);
Stephan N. Kinsella, A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights, 30 LOYOLA L. REV. 607,

613 (1997); Stephan N. Kinsella, New Rationalist Directions in Libertarian Rights Theory, 12 J.
LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 313, 321 (1996); Stephan N. Kinsella, Punishment and Proportionality:
The EstoppelApproach, 12 J. LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 51,57 (1996); Stephan N. Kinsella, Estoppel:
ANew Justificationfor Individual Rights, Reason Papers No. 17 (Fall 1992); Stephan N. Kinsella,
Inalienability and Punishment: A Reply to George Smith, 14 J. LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 79-93
() 998); MURRAY ROTHBARD, THE ETHiCS OF LIBERTY 51-55 (1982).
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the day, a social breakdown is the inevitable result. The Ten
Commandments prohibit not only robbery, but even coveting the
property of others.'
Additionally, egalitarians are unable to follow the Kantian
imperative to make their principles the basis upon which all men act; 5
if we may redistribute land and presumably money from rich to poor,
then why may we not steal from the rich and give to the poor those
characteristics which have allowed them to become wealthy in the first
place? That is, assuming we had the ability to do so, we could take
away the musical ability of Mozart, the athletic accomplishments of
Michael Jordan, the entrepreneurial and innovational attainments of Bill
Gates, the intelligence of Steven Hawking and the sense of humor of
Jay Leno. Were we to engage in such egalitarian redistribution, and
continue the process until there were no difference between those rich
and poor in talent and characteristics, we would have truly reduced the
human race to the undifferentiated blob of a Brave New World.
Third, there is simply no practical reason to engage in land
reform from rich to poor if the goal is to help the poor attain a better
standard of living. If there is one thing that most people have learned
in the last few decades (or, in any case, should have learned) it is that
the last best chance for lifting the poor out of poverty is not to give
them the property of others, butrather grant them economic freedom.7
In comparison to other factors, the redistribution of land does little to
increase overall wealth.
Support for this position can be found in economist David
Friedman's critique on the redistribution of Native American land in the
United States, wherein he wrote,
4See Exodus 20:1-17.
5
See Immanuel Kant, Theory and Practice 1I; Introduction to the Theory ofRight,
in KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS (Hans Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1970).6

ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1946).
7 See JAMES GWARTNEY ET AL., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD 1975-1995
151-70 (1996); see also HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION
IN THE THIRD WORLD 214-29 (1989); ANTHONY DE JASAY, THE STATE 208-32 (1985); HANSHERMANN HOPPE, A THEORY OF SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM: ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND
ETHICS 56 (1989).
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In the U.S. at the moment, if you gave the
country back to the Indians, in some fair way where
you didn't give them the buildings that are built on it,
but just the land; and divided it fairly evenly among
the Indians, it would not noticeably affect the
distribution of income in the U.S. It wouldn't much
affect how well off I am.8
III. HOMESTEADING
How, in the libertarian view, is an original claim to land
justified? We begin our analysis with an excerpt of John Locke's
homesteading theory, wherein he states:
(E]very man has apropertyin his ownperson.
Thus nobody has any right to but himself. The labour
of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are
properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the
state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath
mixed his labour with it, and joined it to something
that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It
being by him removed from the common state nature
placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed
to it that excludes the common right of other men. For
this labour being the unquestionable property of the
labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that
is once joined.9 [Emphasis added]
The above serves only as a starting point. Locke applies his
theory only in cases where there is a superfluity of land. In other

8 David Friedman, Discussion, in MORALITY OF THE MARKET: RELIGIOUS AND

ECONOMIC 9PERSPECTIVES 505 (Walter Block et al. eds., 1985)
JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerningthe True Original, Extant and End of Civil
Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett, ed. 1960).
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words, where there is enough virgin land so that no man can homestead
it all, there is plenty left for the use of others. Libertarians, in contrast,
believe the Lockean theory should be applied in all cases, whether or
not there are sufficient land resources available for other people. 0
What is the alternative to Locke in general or, more
specifically, for the cases where excess land is not available? Several
possibilities exist, the first of which is the claim theory. Under this
approach, a man gets to own land or other natural resources merely by
assertion. "I claim the sun, the moon, the stars, and the oceans," a man
might say, and, if he is the first to do so, he thereby becomes the
legitimate owner. The problems with this are legion. Who will know
who has claimed what? There could be numerous people claiming the
same thing at the same time; this theory offers no way to choose
between them. According to folk wisdom, "talk is cheap." Anyone can
say anything he wants, and as such, mere speech should not entitle
anyone to own anything.
A second approach utilizes the apparatus of the state. With
regard to unowned land, the government can give this property to its
favorites, sell it to the highest bidder in an auction, or parcel it out on
a first-come-first-serve basis." But why should politicians and
bureaucrats own unused land? What did they do to deserve proprietary
status? Even if the government sells the land instead of giving it away,
the government already has far too many resources; why should they
possess any more?
Third, there is the doctrine of equal sharesfor all individuals.
To illustrate, if there are six billion of us, then we all own one six
billionth of all virgin land. This is rather arbitrary, as we do not all own
equal shares of anything else, up to and including human capital. The
following example by Professor Rothbard illustrates the problem
inherent in this theory: "It is difficult to see why a newborn Pakistani
baby should have a moral claim to a quotal share of ownership of a

I°See ROTHBARD,

supra note 3, at 53.
" See, e.g, U.S. Homesteading Act, 12 U.S. Statutes at Large, §75 et seq. (1862).
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piece of Iowa land that someone has just transformed into a wheatfield2
-- and vice versa of course for an Iowan baby and a Pakistani farm."1
A fourth possibility is the theory of communal ownership with
proportionate distribution of shares. In this view, we do not each own
one six-billionth of all virgin land on an individual basis; rather, we
own it all, communally. In other words, before anything can be done
with specific pieces of land, all of us, or at least a majority, must agree.
This sounds like either a recipe for interminable committee meetings or,
more likely, the concentration of power in a small set of the population.
A fatal flaw in all of these theories can be illustrated not with
the ownership of land, but of something even more important, the
human person. Civilized people agree to individual ownership of
ourselves. This is consistent with homesteading. Initially, when we are
born, we are unable to "homestead ourselves," or rather, mix our labor
with our own persons. Our parents perform tasks for us and thus, in a
sense, "own" us throughout infancy. 3 Then, as we reach adulthood, we
gradually take control over our bodies, or "homestead" them in effect,
and thus come to own them fully. Perhaps an application of the above
mentioned theories of property ownership to the ownership of people
will prove insightful.
Under the claim theory, anyone could claim control over
anyone else, provided only that he was the first to do so. This is a
recipe for slavery on a grand scale, and must be rejected on that basis
alone. Government ownership of people is similarly unacceptable.
This merely shifts the slave master from the first claimant to the state.
Or, to put this in another manner, it would hearken back to medieval
days in Europe, or to Oriental despotism, where the king was
considered the literal owner, to do with as he wished, with all his
subjects. Likewise, the theory of equal sharesfor all individualsis also
unsatisfactory. Obviously, if we were to do things in this way, Michael
Jordan and Bill Gates would have been given far more than an equal
share. They would, at least partially, have to do the bidding of the rest

12MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY 35 (1973).

13More exactly, own the right to keep raising, or homesteading us. For the
libertarian perspective on children, property and ownership. See id. at 97-112.
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of us. Who could argue in favor of ordering around some people
merely because they were born with or developed extra talents and
abilities? Finally, communal ownership also fails when it comes to
control over human beings. If interpreted literally, no individual could
so much as scratch his nose without the permission of at least a
majority of six billion people. Under such a system, the human race
would surely perish.
IV. THE PONTIFICAL COUNCIL'S DOCUMENT'

4

A. Concentration and Misappropriation of Land
The Pontifical Council ("hereinafter Council") often refers to
the phrase, "concentration and misappropriation of land" in a negative
manner.' 5 But why must high concentration necessarily be equated
with misappropriation? In the United States, there is high concentration
in the computer, automobile and movie industries, which are dominated
The same
by a handful of very large and prosperous entities.
phenomenon occurs with regard to the ownership of agricultural land
in the United States, where the farming sector is a significant
contributor to overall economic wealth. There are sizable farms and
ranches, such as in Texas and Montana, which are measured not so
much in acres, nor even in hectacres, but rather in square miles. Even
so, apart from some Nader-ite attacks on "agribusiness," the large size
of these farms has not led to, nor does it constitute, "misappropriation."

14Roger Card et al., Toward a Better Distributionof Land: The Challenge of

AgrarianReform, NAT'L CATt. REP., Vol 34, No. 22 (April 3, 1998). [hereinafter
Presentation].Our commentary is based on the organization of the Presentation. We shall not
discuss each and every section, as there is much repetition between them, and some are
irrelevant to our concerns. Indeed, the organization of this document, or rather lack of it,
makes a reply to it rather difficult. There are several recurrent themes of interest, and we will
comment on all of them, but some are spread all throughout the document, stated in slightly
different formats each time.
15 See id. para. 1, 2, 4. Indeed, there are very few paragraphs
in the entire
document which do not criticize "land concentration."
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B. Developing Economies
The Council continually uses the term "developing economies"
to refer to the poor nations of the third world. The use of this phrase is
highly inaccurate. Characterizing an economically deteriorating nation
as "developing" cannot possibly materially help any nation or its
citizens. An acknowledgment of the truth is the first step in correcting
the real problems these nations are facing. Denial is of little use in
either economics or psychology. The point is that many of these
countries are not developing at all; some are barely holding their own,
while others are actually retrogressing from an economic development
point of view. The Council's choice of words camouflages this reality.
1. Factors of Production
In the Council's economic analysis, "land ...
given the
predominantly agricultural nature of the economy ...
constitutes the
fundamental production factor, together with labor, and the chief
source of national wealth."' 6 This is a curious conclusion. The
document under consideration is concerned solely with land reform.
This would imply, given the goal of economic development, that land
is the key factor in production. Why, then, is the phrase "together with
labor" added to the statement? Could it be that the writers of this
document realize that land reform is not all that important, even to a
predominantly agricultural nation? This realization comes from the
fact that labor,on the margin, contributes far more to GDP than land. 7
Even in the undeveloped countries people own their own labor. Hence,
this admission by the Council seriously undercuts their thesis.
This, however, is only the beginning of the problem. There are
other factors ofproduction beyond land and labor, most notably capital.
But capital, based on savings and engendered by security of property

161d para. I (emphasis added).
17
1n 1992, labor's distribution of the United States National Income was 74.1%. In
1980 this figure was 75.9%, indicating only a slight variation. See Morgan Reynolds,
ECONOMICS OF LABOR 55.
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rights, tends to avoid nations which engage in the socialist, egalitarian
"reform" of land holdings, thus further leading to impoverishment.
While no one can move land from one place to another, this immobility
certainly does not apply to capital. The point is that the Council's thrust
is in the direction of killing the goose which will, at least potentially,
create the golden eggs.
2. Preferential Option for the Poor
The clergymen begin this section on a sound footing, with their
embrace of the "preferential option for the poor."' 8 It has been well said
that a society may fairly be judged by how its poor are treated. If there
is any obvious conclusion which must be drawn from an international
economic comparison of countries, it is that the poor in rich nations are
treated far more decently than those in the underdeveloped part of the
world. If anything, the poor in places such as Switzerland, the United
States and Canada boast of more material possessions than even the
middle class in many parts of the globe. Were Roger Cardinal
Etchegaray, the author of the Council's land reformation document,
serious about improving the lot of the poor in the third world, he would
advocate economic development of the sort enjoyed in Europe, North
America, Japan and other such countries; that is, a great reliance on
private property and free markets.
How did these wealthy nations achieve their present enviable
economic status? Clearly, it was by embracing economic freedom,
private property rights, and the rule of law. 9 Therefore, anything the
clergy advocate in this direction will be helpful to the poor. But
18

Presentation,supra note 14, para. 2.
1 See generally PETER T. BAUER, REALITY AND RHETORIC: STUDIES INTHE
ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT 38-52 (1984); see also PETER T. BAUER, EQUALITY, THE THIRD
WORLD, AND ECONOMIC DELUSION 86-102 (1981); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH:
THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD 108-20 (1989); JAMES GWARTNEY ET AL.,
THE FRASER INSTITUTE, ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD, 1975-1995 36-42 (1996); F.A.
9

HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1973); HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, A THEORY OF
SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM: ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND ETHICS 53-60 (1989); ADAM SMITH,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 52-63 (Edwin

Cannon, ed. 1965) (1776).
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anything in the opposite direction will be harmful, and thus contrary to
the preferential option for the poor, the presumed motivating axiom of
the entire document. How well then does the Cardinal's statement do
when measured against these criteria? While there are some
exceptions, the overall assessment, unfortunately, is negative. The
analysis and evidence behind our assessment is explored below.
3. Latifundia
The Pontifical Council defines "latifundia" as "large land
holdings, often belonging to absentee owners, where the land is worked
on by hired labour, using out-dated farming techniques."2 This would
be unexceptionable but for the fact that the Council sees the latifundia
as a basic cause of the problems of the third world.2 What is the basis
of this opinion? After all, as we have seen, "large land holdings" are
characteristic of many countries with a vibrant agricultural sector, such
as the United States and Canada.
Nor are "absentee owners" a barrier to economic development.
Much real estate in advanced industrial nations is owned by people who
do not live in their own high-rises. The corporation itself, emblem of
economic success if ever there was one, is a paradigm case of"absentee
ownership." Here, millions of people buy shares in companies which
own land, mines, farms, resources all over a country, and, in the case of
multinationals, all around the world. Surely stockholders are all
"absentees." Are the clergy attacking the very idea of the corporation
as economically unviable? One would have thought that with the
toppling of the Soviet Union this sentiment would no longer be
expressed quite so blatantly. It appears, however, that such thinking is
wrong. Despite the Council's position, it is clear that an objective
examination of economic reality shows that the criticism of the
latifundia is misplaced.

20
2t

Presentation, supra note 14, para. 2, n.2.
See id.
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4. Competence
The Council states that its land reformation document "is not
a document of political intent, for that lies outside the Church's field of
competence. 0 2 This issue would not have been brought up but for its
entanglement with economics, since to do so would smack of
argumentum ad hominem. It is not for us to state that only those with
doctorates in economics are competent to analyze current economic
issues, such as those involving the development of third world
countries. However, since the'Pontifical Council brought up this issue,
perhaps it is appropriate to discuss it. In the Council's view, they are
not competent to discuss political intent, but, presumably, they are
competent to discuss economic development. But why the difference?
Are they not theologians,therefore unqualified to also act as political
scientists and economists? If so, what is the argument for competence
in the latter but not the former?
5. Mortgage of the Past
The Council states that "[p]rivate appropriation of the land ...
introduced serious distortions into the land market. 23 This sounds
suspiciously like an advocacy of Soviet or Cuban style collectivized
farming, systems that have never been accused of being based upon
"private appropriation." The Council proceeds to note five market
distortions. 24 Before examining these in detail, it is necessary to set
into context the bishops' charges. Clearly located in the socialist camp,
they are stating that markets, capitalism, free enterprise, etc., are to
blame for the plight of the poor, and that government action, such as
taking land from the rich and giving it to the poor, is the solution.
The first market distortion is the government's forcing of
indigenous populations into artificial groups and locating them on
reservations. The reservations are often located in "infertile areas, far
22

1d. para. 2.

23

1d. para. 4.

24

See id., para. 4, n.5.
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from [economic] markets or poor in infrastructures." 25 The problem is
that the government, and only the government, has the legal power to
force the geographic relocation of the populace. Additional examples
of forced relocation include the creation and maintenance of a German
ghetto for the Jews during World War II, zoning laws in general, and
the "Jim Crow" legislation in the American South following the Civil
War. The common denominator is that it is the state which imposes
such mandates. How, then, can the blame rest with the market?
Imprisoning specific portions of the population in infertile or otherwise
inhospitable areas represents a- "government failure," not a "market
failure."
The second market distortion is "the imposition of
discriminatory taxes on the produce of small indigenous farmers. ' 26 It
can hardly be denied that this too is due to government action, not to
market action. Ironically, this charge is most often raised by
clergymen. The Church itself advocates discriminatory taxes in the
form of land redistribution. Although the Church's redistribution plans
generally favor the poor rather than the rich, who are traditionally the
government's beneficiaries, both practices are discriminatory.
The third market distortion occurs when a pricing system is
adopted that works in favor of large producers and to the disadvantage
of small farmers.2 7 Price controls create this distortion and are clearly
created by the government, not private citizens. Only the government
has the legal power to impose price controls. A fourth distortion can be
found in "the imposition of import barriers in order to protect the
produce of large landowners from international competition. "2 Again,
only the state has the capacity to set up barriers to international trade.
Such barriers are indeed serious impediments to economic growth and
are in need of control or elimination.
The final market distortion involves "the provision of public
services and subsidies from which only large landholdings could, in

25
d.
26

at 5(a.).
1d. at n.5(b).
271d.at n.5(e).

28Id. at n.5(d).
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actual practice, benefit." 29 At first glance, this seems consistent with
laissezfaire capitalism. However, it is the government and not the
market that is providing the services and subsidies. Taken on its face,
it seems the argument should be to end business subsidies because they
represent a market distortion. Then, the so-called "public services"
would be provided privately. This comports with the libertarian
philosophy. 30 However, the present authors believe that the Pontifical
Council's document reflects the likelihood that the clergy may agree

with this result more in principle than in practice.
C. Industrialization at the Expense of Agriculture
The Council's document is, for the most part, a socialist creed
written in opposition to private property rights. Nevertheless, there are
portions which support market theory and criticize government
regulations. For example, the document attacks protectionism,
exchange rate manipulation and price controls. 3 Again, this comports
with the classic liberal perspective. However, it is worth noting that the
document appears to represent the product of a diverse committee
composed of theologians with both pro- and anti-government
sentiments.32 It is apparent that there was little communication between
the divergent groups.33

29

1d. at n.5(e).
See Rothbard, supra note 12, at 194-241.
3
1See Presentation,supra note 14, para. 6.
32 This has given rise to what can only be called the 'Daddy likes me best" school
of commentary. Since the PC has both pro and anti market elements, commentators from both
sides have each stressed the parts of the document which favors their own position, and then
claimed that the Church, or the Cardinal in this case, or the Pope in the case of several of the
Papal Encyclicals, is "really on their own side.' In sharp contrast, the present commentary
has no ax to grind in this regard. If we say so ourselves, it'is a straightforward political
economic analysis of 'Toward a Better Distribution of Land" which notes that it contains both
support for,33and criticism of, capitalism.
Sometimes libertarians are accused of a similar sort of inconsistency, for we favor
both economic (laissez faire capitalism) and political liberty (civil liberties, free speech). In
contrast, the overwhelming majority of commentators favor either economic but not civil
liberty (conservatives) or civil, but not economic liberty (socialists). To champion both is thus
to be held internally self-contradictory. However, in the libertarian philosophy, freedom is a
30
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The Pontifical Council concludes that unwise government
interventions in free enterprise have led to a "fall in farm income
[which] has affected small producers so badly that many have been
forced to give up farming."34 The Council assumes that there are
negative consequences when people are "forced to give up farming."
However, this is not necessarily so. In the United States, the market has
similarly "forced" people out of farming. The result has been an
increase in productivity within both the agricultural sector and the
industrial sector. This has led to enhanced income and wealth.
Strictly speaking, of course, the market can never "force"
anyone to do anything. The market simply consists of no more and no
less than the concentration of all voluntary economic interactions.
Perhaps a more accurate way of describing the process is that people
are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand"3 6 to do that which is in the
best interests of the economy. It is a result of the market that people
have moved from the farm to the city where productivity is higher. The
market may exert economic pressure on farmers to move to the city, but
any given farmer in the United States is free to remain where he is. The
result has been simply that the farmer has had to accept a lower income
because consumers place a higher value on goods made in the cities.
The Council, on the other hand, views the move toward
industrialization as problematic per se. The Church clearly favors
reduced poverty. However, at the same time, the Church seems to favor
the maintenance of a farm-based economy. There appears to be a
logical inconsistency here. The Church wants to improve the
conditions of the poor but not at the expense of farming.

seamless web, which must be pursued in any and all directions. The contradiction, then, takes
place on both of these other place on the political economic spectrum, not on our own patch of
it.

34
35

Presentation, supra note 14, para. 6.

Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, & UTOPIA 163 (1974) (stating the market

consists of 36"capitalist acts between consenting adults").
See SMITH, supra note 19.
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D. Failure of Agrarian Reform
The Council discusses what it views as the reasons for the
failure of past efforts in land reform.37 In addition to the concentration
problem, there is a failure of "preventing the expulsion of large masses
of peasant farmers from the land that is still free, but which may be
38 However, this argument can be shown
marginal .....
to be incorrect.
Given that free enterprise is the key to economic development of third
world countries and that private property rights are integral to free
enterprise, then anything which promotes private property rights should
in turn reduce poverty. The right to expel farm workers, if they are no
longer needed, is a component of private property. Therefore, be it ever
so counterintuitive, the right of expulsion is actually a means of
enhancingoverall wealth.
Additionally, the Pontifical Council's opposition to "migration
to urban centers"39 may be counterproductive. For example, the
migration of black farm workers from rural states such as Mississippi
and Alabama to urban areas such as Chicago, Detroit and Philadelphia
during the 1940s and 1950s resulted in economic growth. Surely the
Council can recognize that it would have been economically
disadvantageous for people to have stayed on the farms.
Economists place great value on the phenomenon of "voting
with the feet" as an indicator of economic well-being. If there is a
migration lasting several years in duration then the newcomers can tell
those still on the farm of the benefits of city life. If those who had
remained subsequently migrate to an urban center, then that migration
provides strong evidence that life is better in the new venue.
Historically this pattern has occurred under various circumstances. For
example, there was traffic by Jews out of Nazi Germany, not into it.
Similarly, the Industrial Revolution was beneficial for poor peasants
who migrated to cities in spite of the factory hardships portrayed by

37

See Presentation,supra note 14, para. 7.
Id.
39
Id.
38
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socialists such as Dickens.4 ° This pattern can also be found in preMandela Apartheid South Africa. It can be deduced that South Africa
was better for blacks than the alternatives available elsewhere because
migration was into South Africa. The migration patterns criticized in
the Presentation demonstrate this pattern. When peasants continue to
flock from farm to city, it is evidence that urbanization is an
improvement in their lives. It is worth noting that churches are also
clustered in cities and are less common in rural areas. The clergy too
are "voting with their feet" by remaining largely urban.
E. Contradictions
The Pontifical Council seems to contradict itself when it calls
for more government contributions to infrastructure as a necessary
component of land reform and economic development. This is contrary
to their notion that large landholders, not poor peasants, tend to benefit
from these social services and subsidies.4' Infrastructure generally
includes items such as roads, harbors, lighthouses, electricity, other
power sources, libraries and public universities. Socialism is hardly the
best way to provide such items. There is little doubt that private capital
would be able and willing to invest in the infrastructure. However, the
Council does not explain why it believes socialism will succeed and the
market will fail in this regard.
The Pontifical Council also calls for "fixing prices" in order to
enhance economic development.42 This is in direct contradiction to its
opposition to "control of food prices. 43 It is clear that both cannot be
correct. Either price controls are a force for economic development or
they are not. Clearly, only the latter is correct. Prices have a role to
play in economic growth. Prices coordinate the decentralized behavior
of millions of consumers, sellers, entrepreneurs, workers, resource

4

°See CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST (Kathleen Tillotson ed., Oxford
Press
1966) (1842).
4
1See Presentation,supra note 14, para. 7.
42

d. para. 8.

43Id. para. 6.
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owners and middlemen. 44 In this manner, uncontrolled prices based on
private property coordinate the market. The only other alternative is
The
central planning, which has always proven unsuccessful.
economic collapse of the Soviet Union is evidence of the negative
effects of cental planning.
The Council intends that "land reform" extend beyond taking
the property of some and giving it to others. In addition to land
redistribution, the Council calls for subsidies, subsidized credit, grants,
government funded improvements in infrastructure, "social services,"
and price fixing or price controls. 45 Clearly such programs require a
great deal of money. The burden is likely to be borne by the taxpayers.
Not only have taxpayers not been at all implicated in the (possible)
Latifundista land theft that contributed to land inequality, they are also
less likely to benefit from the proposed improvements. Furthermore,
the programs proposed are incompatible with free enterprise. Finally,
the Council recognizes that past attempts at land reform have been
accompanied by massive corruption; yet, the Council favors this course
of action without providing any means to prevent corruption from again
occurring.
F. The Management of Agricultural Exports
1. Debt Repudiation
As in the case of land reform, the libertarian can agree with the
socialist as to the propriety of debt repudiation, at least in principle,
while disagreeing as to the specific justification. In contrast, the
conservative, with an imprecise understanding of private property,
rejects this course of action outright. The left wing individual defends
both land reform and debt repudiation on egalitarian grounds believing
that as long as the poor gain, the case is made.

44See MISES, supra note 1, at 53; see also F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF
LIBERTY 112
45 (1960).

See Presentation,supra note 14, para. 8.
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Consider for example an illegitimate government, such as in
Cuba. Suppose that a new libertarian regime somehow takes over this
troubled island nation. Does this new government have the
responsibility to pay off the creditors of Fidel Castro and his fellow
criminals? People who have purchased Cuban bonds fall into two
classes: those who did so under duress, and those who made willing
contributions, either out of ideological support for Cuban style
communism, and/or because the interest rates were attractive to them.
The determination of whether to pay the latter is quite simple. Those
willing lenders were cooperators, or perhaps even conspirators, with a
government that is composed of criminals. Therefore, no repayment is
necessary; indeed, it would be highly improper. The payment
obligation is not as easy to determine in the situation where innocent
people were forced to buy Castro's bonds. Yes, they should be able to
sue Fidel and his minions in order to collect their debt. Their lien
against these people should be a high one. In that sense, there is no
debt repudiation. On the other hand, it would be totally impermissible
for the new regime to tax innocent Cubans to repay these debts. To do
so creates a new set of innocent victims to compensate the first set of
victims.
Of course, a practical question to consider along with
repudiation is the future impact on borrowing. Repudiation makes it is
less likely that new borrowing will occur. Further, a substantial
difference exists between socialists repudiating debt because the
lenders are rich and the borrowers poor, and the libertarians doing so
because the lenders have cooperated with thieves. In the former case,
the bond market may close off entirely or charge such high rates of
interest as to impede future borrowing. With the latter case there is not
enough historical evidence to render an opinion about this essentially
empirical issue.
2. Agrarian Dualism
It is almost an article of faith amongst clerical commentators
on business subjects that selling goods for the export market is
uneconomic. According to the Council, "[i]f the market prompts small
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farmers to grow export crops, this often takes place at the expense of
production intended mainly for their own consumption, thus putting
farming families at considerable risk.,4 6 This view amounts to
economic illiteracy. The only way the market can "prompt" anyone to
do anything, farmers or industrialists, large or small, is by holding out
the prospect of greater profits. Should American wheat farmers stop
their production for export, and instead produce something consumed
in the U.S., such as apple pie? Should German exporters of
Volkswagens cease and desist, and instead manufacture wienerschnitzel, something beloved of local consumers? Should a small
family firm in the tulip bulb industry of Holland cancel production for
the world market because "unfavorable climatic or market conditions
can lead to a vicious circle of hunger, so that such families contract
debts that then force them to give up ownership of their land"? 47 To ask
these questions is to answer them.
The business world is unpredictable. Indeed, it is the essence
of the entrepreneurial function to bear risk. There are no guaranteed
safe havens - any businessman, no matter how powerful, must risk
financial loss. This applies to exporters and importers, as well as those
who produce for the local market. Self-sufficient family farms, beloved
of the clergy, like small family groceries, can also prove to be
uneconomic.
It is one thing to use the cloak of theology to give good
business consulting advice; even this is problematic, as it exceeds the
competence of the authors. It is quite another to give erroneous
opinions, cloaked under the authority of the Church, which might well
This is no
be believed by unsophisticated people in the third world.
48
way to promote the "preferential option for the poor.

4 6d.
7
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G. Expropriation of the Land of Indigenous Populations
According to the Council, "the rights of the indigenous
inhabitants have been ignored when the expansion of large scale
.... 49
agricultural concerns... (and industry).., have been decided
The clergy are absolutely correct in claiming that Indian lands have
been stolen throughout history. They are on morally firm ground in
implying that these wrongs should be righted, despite claims to the
contrary from conservatives who favor the status quo in terms of land
ownership, believing that any forced changes would be a violation of
private property rights.
However, the clergy here tread on thin ice in several regards.
First of all, "large scale" agriculture, hydroelectric, mineral, oil and
timber interests are not the only ones to have ridden rough shod over
native property rights. Small concerns have also done so. Second,
these thefts, or takings, are by no means as extensive as thought of in
some quarters, at least on Lockean grounds. The fact of the matter is
that we are talking about people with essentially stone-age technology
who were for the most part incapable of homesteading property. Much,
but not all, tribal behavior consisted of hunting and gathering, not in
mixing their labor with the land as in farming. To be sure, then, such
people would be the legitimate owners of all the berries they had
gathered and animals they had killed, etc., as well as of their northern
and southern camping grounds, and the right of access from one to the
other. But a mere handful of natives could not have homesteaded
anything approaching the entire territory of the continental United
States before the arrival of the Europeans. The point is, LockeanLibertarian homesteading theory requires that the Indians mix their
labor with the land; that they transform it in some way. This, for the
most part, they failed to do, and therefore cannot be considered its
legitimate owners. While they would be considered proper owners of
the relatively small areas where they pitched their tents and farmed,
they would not be the owners of the vast areas in which they traveled
and hunted.
9

4 1d. para. II.
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Finally, "the burden of proof' rests with those who wish to
alter property titles. Otherwise, we are reduced to claim theory for all
property. An individual can claim he is the rightful owner of another's
land or wristwatch, but unless he can offer proof of his contention there
is no warrant for transferring these items from the one to the other. Yet,
the Council goes so far as to admit that "the origins of' Indian
ownership claims to land "are lost in memory." 50 If so, how can any
rational court grant these claims? They state, further that "[i]ndigenous
populations can also run the absurd but very real risk of being seen as
'invaders' of their own land." 5' But where is it engraved in stone that
this is "their own land"? If they never injustice owned the land in the
first place, and then others arrived who did homestead it, then it is not
at all incorrect to characterize the natives as "invaders," not of their
own land, but of the land of these later arrivals.
The libertarian theory is not merely an excuse for the status
quo, as is that of the right wing. It is not merely the dressing up in
more sophisticated clothing of the conservative head in the sand attitude
toward land reform. Yet it may well appearthis way when we consider
very ancient wrongs, or those done to people with stone-age technology
who thus have no written records to support their claims. However,
with regard to more recent events where there is physical evidence of
robbery (e.g., the Nazis and the Jews, the Americans and the Japanese
in the early 1940s, and even black pre-civil war slavery in the United
States) the libertarian and conservative conclusions as well as
underlying analyses are very different.
H. Violence and Complicity
The clerics quite properly oppose "terror." But one man's terror
may be another man's self defense. Property rights are the only way to
tell if A's fist is imposing on B's face, or if B's face is attacking A's fist.
Consider again Professor Rothbard's analysis of "A, seizing B by the

5
5°ld.
1

id.
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wrist and grabbing B's wristwatch. 5' 2 Who is aggressing against whom
in this action? It all depends upon who is the rightful owner of the
timepiece. If the property belongs to B, then A is indeed the terrorist.
The same thing appears to have occurred between the
latifundistas and the landless peasants. The clergy see the former as
using violence on the latter, and too quickly assume they are guilty of
terror. But if the land properly belongs to the large latifundistas, then
all those who squat on their property, or trespass upon it, or attempt to
take it over, are the real criminals. Property rights determine terror;
without this understanding, we cannot possibly distinguish an invasion
from self defense.
Suppose that landless peasants "sat in" on church property,
attempting to turn these edifices devoted to worship to housing for
themselves. Would not the reaction of the priest be to call in the police
for eviction, thus resorting to what these trespassers would see as
"terror"? And what of the defense of "protests of workers who are
forced to work at an inhuman pace for wages that often do not cover
This Council charge is
their travel and living expenses. 0 3
economically incomprehensible. The wage depicted by the clergy
would have to be below that of subsistence level. Even slaves were
paid a wage greater than "living expenses" in terms of food and shelter;
otherwise they would have perished. Wages are determined in markets
based on productivity. This must of necessity be higher for free men
than slaves, if only because there are no costs of guarding the former
from escape which must be deducted from the former's productivity.
Thus, ceterusparibus,free labor must always be paid more than slaves.
And if slaves are paid enough to keep them alive, free persons must be
paid even more. Thus, this charge is an untenable one.
I. Legal Recognition of Ownership Rights
The Council complains of the fact that it is difficult "for small
farmers to obtain legal recognition of ownership rights over land that
52
53
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they have been farming for a long time and of which they are the de
facto owners." The problem with this is that there can be no such thing
as de facto ownership, where a different person has actual title to the
land, and is thus the de jure owner.
How could such a situation arise? One possibility would be for
a tenant to farm land for many years for an absentee owner, and then,
suddenly, to declare that he, the farmer, was the real owner, and that the
landlord to whom he had been paying rent for decades was not.
Another would be the case of an owner of land who allowed a passerby
to take a shortcut through his property, so much so that over the years
a path was worn by his footsteps; whereupon the traveler, instead of
being grateful to the owner, asserts his access rights.
Were this sort of thing countenanced by the courts, it would
place into disrepute private property, and with it, capitalism, the system
which has brought about modern civilized standards of living.
Alternatively, no one would ever allow passerby access to one's land;
and tenancy would become a thing of the past. This would run counter
to the preferential option for the poor, as they are people of limited
means, who cannot afford to buy homes, cars, farms, etc., and are thus
the main beneficiaries of tenancy.
J. Environmental Concerns
The authors of this report worry that without seizing the land
of the latifundistas, there will be an "over-exploitation of natural
resources without concern for environmental sustainability or without
t 54
considering the intergenerational continuity of family property.
Environmental degradation, running out of resources, extinction of
species, and other legitimate environmental concerns simply have
nothing to do with who owns the land, provided only that it is held in
private, not public, hands. The reason for this is rather straight forward.
54

1d. para. 14. In another section, the clerics express the view that "inequalities in
the distribution of land ownership set in motion a process of environmental degradation that is
hard to reverse.' Id. para. 21. For a critique of this sentiment, see PollutionTrading Permits
as a Form of Market Socialism, and the Searchfor a Real Market Solution to Environmental
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When an individual or family farmer or large firm in the agriculture
business industry owns land, or a cow, or a tractor, they tend to take
care of them. They do not overuse these resources, or dissipate them.
If they fail to act in this manner, they suffer the full attendant losses.
In very sharp contrast, when items such as these are owned in
common through coercion, when no one really owns them but all may
partake in their use, they are in great danger. Under such
circumstances, the user is not confronted with the full costs of his
actions. For example, a farmer would be foolish to allow his sheep to
graze too long on his own land, since if he does, the grass will be eaten
down to its roots, and will not regrow easily. He has every incentive to
preserve this land for another day, for if he does, he is assured that his
sheep will be the ones who benefit. On the other hand, if the pasture is
compulsorily held in common by all shepherds, then none of them has
an economic incentive to act in this environmentally and economically
sound way. Here, if he moves his sheep up the mountain to another less
accessible pasture, he has no guarantee at all that when he returns to the
more convenient one, the grass will be held for his animals. On the
contrary, it is almost certain that someone else will come along and
allow their sheep to overgraze.
K. The Credit Market
The Council takes the position that "[i]n rural areas, there is
often no legal credit market, so that small farmers have to turn to
money lenders if they need loans, thus exposing themselves to risks that
can lead to the partial or even total loss of their land -- for property
speculation is usually the real focus of such moneylenders'
operations." 55 There are numerous economic fallacies espoused here.
First, a confusion exists in the passage between the geographical and
the legal spheres. Lack of a legal credit market results from
jurisprudence and not location. When an enactment forbids credit, or
sets interest rate maximums, it can apply to either rural or urban areas.

55Presentation,supra note 14, para. 15.
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No presumption exists, as the clergymen contend, that this law applies
with greater feverishness to the rural milieu rather then the urban.
Secondly, money lenders are part of the credit market. While
the clergy thinks all money lenders loan at very high rates, this is not
always the case. Basically, what determines the rate of interest in a
given society is time preference: the impatience of the populace to
consume now, as opposed to deferring gratification for the future. If
the former, then a high interest rate ensues; if the latter, a low one.
Imagine a society composed primarily of seven year old school
children, each of whom would gladly give up five candy bars tomorrow
to have one today. Very few of them would be willing to lend at almost
any interest rate, and most would be willing to borrow at virtually any
cost. Interest rates will thus be very high, regardless of other
occurrences. At the opposite end of the spectrum are people who "save
for a rainy day." They are willing to lend money even at low rates of
interest, and rarely borrow, even when it is cheap to do so. A low
interest rate will prevail in such a society. In other words money
lenders, and the interest rates they charge, are merely the messengers
for the underlying economic realities. 6
Finally, the real cause of artificially high interest rates stems
from laws prohibiting usury. Imposing ceilings upon interest payments
creates a situation where only individuals with good collateral obtain
loans, which tend to be large enterprises. Small businesses and other
risky borrowers with little collateral and poor repayment records have
to deal in the black market, at much higher interest rates because of the
laws against usury; the lender, as a law breaker, cannot rely upon the
courts to help collect bad debts. Only exorbitant interest rates
compensate a lender enough to risk loans to such enterprises. This
means that the "risks" are borne not by the small borrowers whose
interests the Counsel think they are defending, but by the usurious
money lenders. The small and/or risky borrower does not face risk, but
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rather faces either astronomical interest to attract the loan or the
inability to obtain financing at all.
Property speculation, or any other kind, does not represent the
evil that the Council believes. Instead, the market process of
speculation places goods and services into the hands of those who value
them greatest, as demonstrated by willingness to pay. The speculator
helps stabilize price differentials so that the same price for the same
commodity, apart from transportation and other such costs, prevails
everywhere. For example, if oranges are selling for one dollar in
Miami and two dollars in Boston, the speculator will take advantage of
this difference by purchasing cheap southern oranges and transporting
them north. The first part of this operation raises the prices of oranges
in Miami, and the second part lowers them in Boston.
While money lenders may sometimes speculate in land, and
land speculators may sometimes lend money, the two professions are
not at all economically connected, as the clergymen espouse. The only
common bond between lenders and speculators mirrors the bond
between middlemen and landlords: All four are cordially hated by
socialists as emblematic of capitalism.
L. Idle Land
The Counsel states, with regard to the case for breaking up the
Latifundias, and redistributing them to the landless poor, that "[s]uch
large landholdings are often poorly cultivated, or simply left
. "" If these holdings represent stolen
uncultivated for speculation ...
property then a strong moral case exists for redistributing them not to
the poor, but to the children of the victims. However, to offer "poor
cultivation" as a reason for land reform implicitly acknowledges the
legitimacy of these property titles; in effect, the clergy argue that, even
if the latifundistas had clear and legitimate title to their lands, they
should still lose their land on grounds of poor cultivation.
If true, more land would exist to redistribute than to merely the
latifundias in the third world. Anything left idle would be fair game.
57Presentation,supra note 14, para. 32.
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For example, Mr. A goes on a year long holiday for a trip around the
world. He leaves his home vacant and loses ownership in it. Mr. B
doesn't use his fifteen speed bicycle, tennis racket or fishing rod for five
years; long before that time, his property rights in these items lapse.
Miss C doesn't wear her blue dress for a few years, with the same result.
Farmer D utilizes his land only eight months of the year, allowing it to
lie fallow for the remaining four months. A teenager leaves his childish
toys in the attic; when he tries to recover them, he is told he no longer
owns them. An old man sticks his money in his mattress for years, "for
a rainy day," and thereby loses it.
The problem of this philosophy, apart from the blatant
unfairness of seizing idle property, is that it disregards Keynes'
"precautionary motive."5 8 People value their possessions whether they
"use" them or not. Alternatively, and perhaps preferably, people do not
always use them in normally accepted standards. The point is, Mr. A's
home, Mr. B's sports equipment, Miss C's dress, Farmer D's land, the
teenager's toys and the old man's money are not really "idle." They
only appear so to outsiders. One man's lack of cultivation or idleness
is another man's valuable contemplation or financial support against the
unknown future. If the goods did not provide services, if they were
truly idle, they would be sold. Thus, people occasionally sell their
homes, dresses, toys, etc. Are there no Church owned bibles, organs,
churches, surplices, wine, automobiles, or wafers that go unused for any
appreciable amount of time? If so, these would be forfeited under the
philosophy adumbrated by the Council.
M. The Lack of Infrastructures and Social Services
In the view of the Pontifical Council, "small farmers are forced
to depend on local markets to sell their produce... They are also
dominated by traders whose monopolistic position means that farmers
are forced to accept the price offered if they want to sell their
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produce."59 The clergymen illuminate an important issue, but their lack
of economic sophistication distorts its perception. The clergy raise the
issue of marketing boards, which are government entities that prohibit
farmers from selling to anyone but themselves. Also, the boards
typically purchase at prices far below levels farmers could otherwise61
6
attain, whether on local or world markets. 0 These monopsonists
exploit farmers, particularly small ones who cannot bribe their way out
of these regulations or otherwise avoid them.
The flaw with the cardinal's analysis is that the boards are
government entities, not a part of the market. To label them "traders"
confuses markets with central planning and economic freedom with
economic coercion. Nor could it be otherwise. If these underdeveloped
countries were dedicated to capitalism, then any local private person
would be a monopsonist who served as the sole purchasing agent for
small farmers and bought at below world market prices, would earn
vast profits. However, this would attract other competitors into the
industry, both local and multinational, which would compete with the
original monopsonistic one to buy farm produce. With greater demand,
prices paid to farmers, even small ones, would increase until the profits
earned in the industry reached market standards, abstracting from risk.
Why, then, do the clergy, being aware of monopsonistic
exploitation of small farmers, not call for an end to governmental
marketing boards? Presumably, the answer is that they have cast their
lot, and their moral authority, with socialist central planners, not free
enterprise, and marketing boards play an integral role in this
philosophy. To frontally attack statist marketing boards would
undermine their moral and intellectual underpinnings.
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N. Economic Consequences
The Council complains of "the pegging of farm wages at low
"Pegging" refers to governmental setting of wage rates.
Pegging at levels below equilibrium would be equivalent to setting
wage maximums. This can cause labor shortages. The clergy, perhaps
unfamiliar with technical economic usage, do not refer to this situation.
Instead, somewhat confusingly, they mention ordinary functioning of
the labor markets and not governmental interference. To wit "this
pegging is a result63of the simultaneous rise in supply and fall in demand
for farm labour.
If true, it causes both happiness and regret. Farm workers will
receive less compensation, which means they are not needed in
agriculture, but, rather, they are in relatively greater demand elsewhere,
presumably in industry. If so, this would roughly follow the United
States pattern, where virtually the entire populace engaged in farm
labor in the 18th century and virtually no one farms at the close of the
20th century.('
levels". 62

IV. CONCLUSION

There is massive suffering on the part of the poor in the
underdeveloped countries of the world. However, this is due to central
planning, socialism, and a public ethic which views with great
suspicion profits, free markets, individual initiative, and
entrepreneurship -- it is not at all the fault of free enterprise and private
property rights.
This story exists the world over. Well meaning critics, ignorant
of the niceties of economic science, see abject poverty and misinterpret
its causes. They have still to learn Adam Smith's lesson that the wealth
of nations stems from economic freedom, not its absence. The
theological critics fail to see the deleterious effects of government

62Presentation,supra note 14, para. 18.
63d"
64 see THE STATISTicAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1998).
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theological critics fail to see the deleterious effects of government
control and, instead, espouse the same policies that created the plight
of the poor in the first place.
It cannot be denied that there has been land theft, occurring in
both the economically underdeveloped part of the globe and the
developed nations. Land reform, based on returning stolen property
from the children of the thieves to the children of the victims, is
justified. But .the burden of proof must reside on those who would
overturn extant property titles. This requirement vitiates against the
undoing of robbery buried in the sands of time, against the very poor
who do not have access to records which can prove their claims, and
against native peoples lacking written records. Thus, while the
libertarian message on land reform is a very radical one in theory, it is
rather conservative in application. It is radical in theory because it is
open to the possibility, which is rather unexpected given its almost total
unanimous rejection on the part of those who ostensibly favor private
property rights.65 On the other hand, as a practical matter, the libertarian
perspective on land reform cannot be expected to support changes in
extant land titles between Jews, Arabs, Palestinians, etc., since their
disputes go back for thousands of years; nor for Indians vis-a-vis white
settlers in the United States for lack of written records. This view may,
however, buttress claims from Japanese Americans stemming from
World War II expropriation.
If the church wishes to promote the interests of the poor, if it
desires to take to heart "the preferential option for the poor," instead of
continually urging socialistic welfare schemes that only impoverish
them, it must make itself more knowledgeable about economics. Then,
as easy as falling off a log, the clergy will realize that the last best hope
for the poor are the institutions of free enterprise, precisely the ones
responsible for the relatively vast wealth enjoyed in the western
industrialized nations.
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